Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions in Services: 
The Role of Policy and Industrial Structure*

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Abstract

This paper explores the role of policy and economic structure in determining international mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in services sectors. The analysis is based on bilateral sectoral M&A flow data and detailed information on policy barriers from a new database. Restrictive investment policies are found to reduce the probability of M&A inflows, controlling for bilateral frictions such as geography. This negative effect, however, is mitigated in countries with relatively large shares of manufacturing and (to a lesser extent) services in GDP. The same result holds for the number of M&A deals concluded. Findings are robust to accounting for the potential endogeneity of policy restrictiveness. The evidence suggests that the impact of policy is state-dependent and related to the composition of GDP in the target economy.

JEL classification: F13, F21, L80

Keywords: Cross-border M&A, services trade policy, trade frictions

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1 Introduction

Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) have been among the most striking international economic phenomena of the last two decades. While the determinants of M&A have been studied at the aggregate level, there is little analysis of the determinants of M&A in services sectors. This is surprising, given that these sectors accounted for 65 percent of global cross-border M&A deals in the period 1990-2012 (UNCTAD, 2013). In this paper, we demonstrate the significance of policy barriers and the structure of the economy as determinants of inward M&A in services sectors. We use comprehensive bilateral M&A flow data and detailed information on policy barriers, drawing upon a new database of investment restrictions in services sectors for a large sample of developed and developing countries.

We proceed in three steps. First, we present some broad patterns emerging from the data. Aggregating transaction-level M&A data to obtain bilateral sectoral flows over the period 2003-2009 reveals positive M&A flows only in 14 percent of the possible cases. The distribution of inbound investment is closely linked to the host economy’s GDP and is highly skewed. The United States at the top end received close to 600 M&A deals, compared to about 200 deals for China in third place. Several countries in East and South Asia stand out in terms of seeing a larger number of inward M&A deals than other countries with comparable income per capita. Banking is quantitatively the most important services sector in our sample, attracting over 1,000 deals worth more than 585 billion dollars, followed by Telecommunications attracting 787 deals. The total volume of M&A transactions in services sectors (2.85 trillion) exceeds the volume in manufacturing sectors (1.6 trillion) by a wide margin.

We also present cross-country evidence on policy restrictiveness on investment in services drawing on a new Services Trade Restrictions Database (Borchert, Gootiiz and Mattoo, 2014). This Database contains detailed information on restrictions regarding the forms of entry, licensing, operations and regulation for six service sectors (banking, insurance, telecommunications, retail distribution, transportation and professional services) in each of
103 countries. These individual restrictions are combined into a Service Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI), which is computed for each sector in each country and also aggregated up to the country level. The latter is broadly declining with income per capita, i.e. developing countries tend to exhibit more restrictive policies than industrial countries. Again, a number of countries in East and South Asia stand out in terms of the greater restrictiveness of their policies compared to those of other countries at comparable levels of income per capita. Across sectors, restrictiveness in transport and legal services seems to be much higher than in other sectors in all countries, irrespective of their level of development.

Second, we propose a stylized conceptual framework to think about M&A, featuring heterogeneous firms and a role for inter-sectoral linkages. The manufacturing sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive, and to produce a homogenous good using labor and intermediate services. This assumption reflects evidence from the OECD STAN Input-Output tables that services are important intermediate inputs in the production of manufacturing across a wide range of countries. Services are characterized by product differentiation and they are produced by heterogeneous firms under monopolistic competition. M&A transactions in services are presented as a way of serving foreign markets, and are subject to fixed costs depending on attributes specific to a country-pair (cultural or physical distance) and the policy environment of the host country. The model can rationalize the existence of zero bilateral M&A flows and, more importantly, the impact on the probability (and number) of M&A deals of policy restrictions is shown to depend on market size, industrial structure—i.e. the shares of agriculture, manufacturing and services in total value added—and the extent of inter-sectoral linkages in the host economy, respectively.

Third, the conceptual framework suggests a two-stage empirical analysis. The first stage consists of estimating a vector of individual country-specific coefficients from a gravity model of bilateral investment flows. In the second stage, the coefficient vector is used as a dependent variable in a search for factors causing variation among the estimated individual country

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1It is now customary to define “trade in services” to encompass also commercial presence of foreign investment. Thus M&A in services, and more generally investment in services, are one of the “modes” through which services can be traded. See Section 2.2 below for more details.
parameters, with particular emphasis on the role of policy barriers to M&A. We conduct the two-step analysis for both the probability of observing positive M&A flows and the total number of M&A deals flowing to different service sectors in individual countries, thereby exploring both the extensive and intensive margin. We use a probit model for the first stage of the extensive margin, and, following Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006), a pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator for the first stage of the intensive margin.

We find that geography and other bilateral frictions affect service sector M&A in a familiar way, and the effects differ in a plausible manner across service sectors. Across countries, the probability of receiving investment through cross-border M&A is strongly positively correlated with market size. Restrictive policy dampens M&A inflows but the negative effect of policy is mitigated in countries with a relatively large shares of manufacturing and (to a lesser extent) services in GDP. The same results hold for the total number of M&A deals received. The results may help explain why policy restrictions have inhibited services investment in the industrializing economies of East and South Asia less than in other parts of the world. We also try to identify individual policy measures that account for the results obtained using the aggregate index. Restrictions on setting up branches, the rules concerning the nationality of the employees, and the lack of transparency in the denial of licenses are amongst the measures that most strongly deter investment.

values on M&As. Boudier and Lochard (2013) explore the impact of deregulation in services on cross-border M&A focusing on the OECD economies. Ahern and Harford (2014) analyze the importance of inter-sectoral linkages on waves of M&As within the U.S. We contribute to this literature by offering for the first time a perspective, through the lenses of an economic model, on the importance of policy barriers on cross-border M&A in a variety of service sectors and for a large sample of developed and especially developing countries, which have not been studied before in this regard.

This paper is also connected to the literature on the measurement of policy restrictiveness in services. We use a novel policy database, described in Borchert et al. (2014). Borchert et al. (2012) use this data to explore the implications for landlocked economies of policy restrictiveness in the telecommunication and air transport sectors.\footnote{Van der Marel and Shepherd (2013) use the data to explore the implication of policy restrictiveness for cross-border trade in services.}

Our findings also speak to the literature on inter-sectoral linkages in FDI patterns. Devereux and Griffith (1998) show that previous FDI in manufacturing attracts additional manufacturing FDI for the U.S. case. Head et al. (1995, 1999) analyze the case of Japan, with similar results. Gross et al. (2005) analyze the case for a sample of Japanese outward investment projects to Europe. They demonstrate how Japanese FDI in manufacturing attracted other Japanese FDI in services, but they also show that the pattern of inter-sectoral linkages in FDI changed substantially over time. Our contribution is to examine the interplay between economic structure and policy.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and in particular discusses the new policy information drawn from the Services Trade Restrictions Database. Section 3 outlines a stylized model of cross-border M&A. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy, while Section 5 contains the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data Description

In this section we explore several dimensions of the data that we use in the paper. In particular, we present: i) the data on cross-border M&A, ii) the data on restrictions to M&A transactions in Services, and iii) some evidence on the importance of sectoral linkages between services and manufacturing.

2.1 Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions Data

We use a comprehensive dataset on global mergers and acquisitions from ThomsonReuters Platinum database, spanning the period 2003-2009. The dataset consists of individual cross-border equity deals between the home country of the acquirer and the host country where the target firm is domiciled. The sector affiliation of a deal is determined by the target firm’s SIC classification.

Table 1 provides basic summary statistics on our investment data. Aggregating information on individual M&A deals across years yields about 19,800 observations. The total value of investment covered amounts to 5 trillion USD, of which 2.8 trillion are undertaken in services sectors. Half of these investments (1.4 trillion) is undertaken in services sub-sectors for which we have policy information. Banking is quantitatively the most important sector in our sample, followed by Telecommunications. In order to explore the geographical distribution of the M&A deals, we report in columns (3) and (4) the total number and value of deals where both the host and the home countries are OECD members. Unsurprisingly, the majority of the deals are among OECD countries. However, non-OECD countries have a somewhat higher share in the total number and value of deals in the service sectors covered.

\[^3\text{We focus on the M&A part of investment flows because the best greenfield data with global coverage that is currently available are not of a quality comparable to the M&A data used here. In addition, the sectoral breakdown used in greenfield data is different from, and less detailed than, the M&A data. Given the data constraints, modelling the choice between M&A and greenfield as a mode of investment would introduce conceptual complexity that cannot be incorporated in the empirical analysis. We do, however, plan to investigate this important aspect in future work.}\]

\[^4\text{The category “Other services” includes Construction Services, Gas and Electricity, Business Services and Personal Services such as Health Services and Education Services.}\]
by our STRI than in other services sectors and in manufacturing.\(^5\) An important feature of the data is that the distribution of M&A flows between countries, although aggregated across years and sectors, still exhibits a large mass point at zero. This is evident from the third column, which reports the percentage share of country pairs where we did observe at least a cross border M&A. Across all sectors, M&A flows are observed only in 14 percent of possible cases.\(^6\)

Furthermore, the distribution of inbound investment is highly skewed. At the top end, one country receives a total of 588 inflows (the United States). Figure 1 shows that the attractiveness for M&A, which underpins the data’s skewness at the extensive margin, is closely linked to the host economy’s GDP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: M&amp;A Investment: Descriptive Statistics</th>
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<td>All countries</td>
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<td>Manufacturing</td>
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Note: Numbers refer to the count measure of deals; values are expressed in Millions of USD.

\(^5\)An important caveat, noted in footnote 3 above, is that we focus in this paper on M&As, which are only a part of total foreign direct investment (FDI). Whereas the alternative mode of entry into a foreign country, namely greenfield FDI, accounts for a small share of total FDI flows into industrial countries, it represents a much larger share of overall FDI inflows into developing countries than M&As. However, in the services sectors covered in this study, i.e. banking, insurance, telecommunications and transport, M&As tend to be a relatively important avenue of FDI even in developing countries. A more comprehensive treatment of FDI is a priority for future research.

\(^6\)The total number of possible country pairs is 12,546, since we have 123 home countries and 102 host countries.
2.2 Service Trade Restrictions Database

The Services Trade Restrictions Database contains information on legal provisions affecting both services trade and services investment. Non-storability and ‘simultaneity of production and consumption’ are characteristics of services provision that have led to a broad notion of international trade in services that encompasses not just cross-border delivery but also supply through investment and the movement of people. While advances in information technology have benefited cross-border trade in services (mode 1), local delivery is still required for many services, making commercial presence (mode 3) a central way of trading services. This broad notion of trade explains why it is now customary to refer to measures affecting foreign investment as trade policies.

Note: top five recipients: USA (588), GBR (456), AUS (193), CHN (188), DEU (166).

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7 The typology of different ‘modes of supply’ was developed by Sampson and Snape (1985) and has largely been incorporated into the design of the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The first of these modes, what has come to be called mode 1 in GATS terminology, is cross-border supply. It applies when service suppliers resident in one country provide services in another country, without either supplier or buyer/consumer moving to the physical location of the other. Mode 2, or consumption abroad, refers to a consumer resident in one country moving to the location of the supplier(s) to consume a service. Mode 3, or commercial presence, refers to judicial persons (firms) moving to the location of consumers to sell services locally through the establishment of a foreign affiliate or branch. Mode 4, or movement of natural persons, refers to a process through which individuals (temporarily) move to the country of the consumer to provide the service.
The Database covers the following five major services sectors: financial services (banking and insurance), telecommunications, retail distribution, transportation, and professional services, with each of these broad sectors further disaggregated into subsectors. It covers a total of 103 economies, of which 79 are developing countries and 24 OECD countries, representing all world regions and income groups. To the best of our knowledge, no other data source provides comparable information on barriers to services trade and investment in a consistent manner for such a wide range of services sectors and countries.

The primary focus of the database is to gather information on policies and regulations that discriminate against foreign services providers, as well as certain key aspects of the regulatory environment. In this paper we draw predominantly on measures affecting foreign investment and include other measures only to the extent that they may be expected to have a bearing on M&A capital flows.

Service Trade Restrictiveness Index. In the analyses below, we make use of individual policy measures as well as the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) developed by Borchert et al. (2014). The STRI is a scalar measure of overall openness for a given subsector-mode combination, e.g. for accepting bank deposits (subsector) by establishing commercial presence abroad (mode 3). All applicable measures within each such combination are evaluated and the overall policy regime is judged to be one of five possible “types”: completely open; completely closed, i.e. no foreign entry allowed at all; virtually open but with minor restrictions; virtually closed but with very limited opportunities to enter and operate; and a residual “middle” category of regimes which allow entry and operations but impose restrictions that are neither trivial nor virtually prohibitive. Each of these five regimes is assigned a value on an openness scale from 0 to 1 with intervals of 0.25. Once a score has been attached to each category, STRI values can be aggregated across modes and sectors using weights that reflect, respectively, the relative importance of modes of delivery in the supply of a specific service and the constituent services sectors in domestic value added for

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8 Regarding policies governing cross-border trade in international air passenger transportation services, the Database draws on the WTO's QUASAR database since it represents the most comprehensive source currently available on bilateral air services agreements, covering over 2000 agreements.
an average industrialized country.\textsuperscript{9}

The index number approach adopted here contrasts with methods of econometrically estimating the restrictiveness of policies based on their impact on some outcome variable of interest, controlling for other determinants. A measure of restrictiveness thus derived can obviously not be employed in an analysis of policy impact, for the variation in the outcome variable has already been used to pin down the relative effect of policy measures. Since in this paper we are interested in the relative effect of policy barriers on investment flows in services sectors, our measure of policy restrictiveness needs to be based on an exogenous judgment that is not by construction linked to the dependent variable of interest.

Notice, though, that our empirical analyses do not hinge on the assumption of STRI scores being exogenous in an econometric sense. We recognize that the commonly made assumption that trade policy is exogenous may not be entirely plausible, and therefore also gauge robustness by employing an instrumental variable (IV) strategy, see Section 5.2 below.

**STRI Scores for Mode 3.** Countries’ overall STRI scores vary widely across per capita income. Most OECD countries exhibit fairly low scores which reflects their general overall openness, notwithstanding some rather restricted subsectors, an aspect to which we will return below, whereas some fast-growing dynamic economies in East Asia such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and China appear to have relatively significant services trade barriers. The same is true for India and some countries in the Middle East. Some of Africa’s poorest nations also have rather restrictive services policies; in particular, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe turn out to be amongst the least open countries in the sample.\textsuperscript{10}

The distribution of STRI scores can be further broken down by world region and service sector (Figure 2). The prevalence of high barriers towards investment in the Middle East and in South/East Asia is again evident. But the relative restrictiveness across sectors is similar in developing and industrial countries. OECD countries and those in Eastern Europe/Central

\textsuperscript{9}More detailed information about the data, the collection process and the construction of the STRI can be found in Borchert, Gootiiz and Mattoo (2012).

\textsuperscript{10}A scatter plot of all countries’ STRI Mode 3 scores against per capita income is provided in the Online Appendix.
Asia, otherwise widely known for their open investment policies, still maintain substantial barriers in transportation and professional services. As a result of these overlaying patterns, STRI scores within countries (across sectors) are only moderately correlated (Table available in the Online Appendix). This suggests that there is substantial variation in policy stances across both sectors and countries, and the empirical analyses will exploit both dimensions.

**Figure 2: Services Investment Restrictiveness, by Region and Sector**

![Bar chart showing services investment restrictiveness by region and sector](image)

Note: 103 countries included

Source: Services Trade Restrictions Database

Regions: GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), SAR (South Asia), MENA (Middle East and Northern Africa), EAP (East Asia and Pacific), AFR (Africa), LAC (Latin America and Caribbean), OECD, ECA (Eastern Europe and Central Asia).
2.3 Sectoral Linkages

A third element we consider in the paper is the importance of sectoral linkages between manufacturing and services. Using information from the OECD STAN Input-Output tables for the mid-2000 for OECD countries and some developing countries produces two stylized facts. First, the average input share of STRI services into manufacturing production (32 percent) is more than twice as high as the share of manufacturing in the production of services (14 percent). Second, there exists considerable heterogeneity in the input-output structure across different countries. The asymmetry between services and manufacturing as inputs and the associated differences in the demand for services across countries motivate some of our modelling choices in the conceptual framework, to which we now turn.

3 Conceptual Framework

In this section we outline a simple conceptual framework on which we build our empirical strategy. Since the conceptual framework draws heavily from the literature on heterogeneous firms (Melitz, 2003) and its extension to dealing with international investments (e.g. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004), we report most of the formal details in the appendix. Here we limit ourselves to sketch the main elements of interest, including a role for inter-sectoral linkages.

Set up. Suppose that there are N countries in the world. In each country, a representative consumer enjoys utility from Agriculture, Manufacturing, and Services. Agriculture is a perfectly competitive sector, and the production of Agricultural goods exhibits constant

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11 Only about a third of the countries for which the STRI index is built are represented in the OECD-STAN database. We consider only services sectors that are covered by the STRI Database. Figures with the complete cross-country distribution of input shares are available in the Online Appendix.

12 This calls for some caution about the practice, common in the literature, of using the input-output structure of the U.S. as a proxy for the input-output structures of other countries. Nordhaus (2010) provides further evidence that there is substantial variation across countries in the share of domestic services embodied in manufactured exports.
returns to scale employing only labor.\textsuperscript{13} Manufacturing is also a perfectly competitive sector, and the homogenous manufacturing good is produced using labor ($L_m$) and intermediate services ($Y_s^m$):

$$Y_m = (L_m)\gamma(Y_s^m)^{1-\gamma}$$

This is the only non-standard assumption we make, and is motivated by the evidence presented in the previous Section.\textsuperscript{14} Profit maximization in the manufacturing sector implies standard demand functions for labor in manufacturing and intermediate services. Services, finally, is a sector characterized by product differentiation and monopolistically competitive firms. The output of services is a C.E.S. aggregator of individual service varieties with elasticity of substitution $\sigma = \frac{1}{1-\rho} > 1$ Firms in the service sector are heterogeneous in the sense of Melitz (2003). The production function for each service variety is $y_s = aL_s$, where $a$ is a measure of labor productivity, drawn from a distribution with a cumulative distribution function $G(a)$ over a support $[a_L, a_H]$. Naturally, the most productive firm in a given country $i$ is $a_iH$.\textsuperscript{15} Profit maximization in the service sector implies a standard optimal pricing rule as a markup over marginal costs.

\textbf{M&A in Services.} We focus our attention on the possibility of M&As in services from a given country $i$ to a country $j$.\textsuperscript{16} Importantly, we are not at this stage considering cross-border trade as an alternative way of providing services. Including this alternative would not affect the main insights we want to focus on but would add unnecessary complexity.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{13}By choosing Agriculture to be the numeraire, this assumption pins down a unitary wage (under the assumption of free labor mobility between sectors).

\textsuperscript{14}Obviously, manufacturing itself is a more important input into the production of manufacturing than services, and services are a more important input into the production of services than manufacturing. We are not explicitly incorporating these features into the model, and choosing instead to consider “net-output” production functions for each sector.

\textsuperscript{15}Here we are making the simplifying assumption that the production of services does not use intermediate manufacturing inputs. Relaxing this assumption, however, would not change any of the qualitative results on which we want to focus our attention.

\textsuperscript{16}The model does not distinguish between M&A and greenfield FDI. See Nocke and Yeaple (2007) for a model explaining possible determinants of these different foreign markets entry modes. However, the data employed cover only M&A deals.

\textsuperscript{17}This assumption implies that we are not exploring here the proximity-concentration trade-off that has been central to the study of horizontal FDI in the manufacturing sector. As we have argued above, the case for the existence of such a trade-off is much less clear in services, especially given that for some services (for
We assume that the target firm inherits the productivity of the parent firm \((a_i)\).\(^{18}\) Under this assumption, using the results of the manufacturing firms’ maximization problem, the service firms’ maximization problems and the consumer utility maximization problem, it is possible to express gross profits for the acquiring firm as:

\[
\Pi_{ij} = \Upsilon_j \cdot P_j C_j (\beta + (1 - \gamma) \alpha) \cdot a_i^{\sigma - 1}
\]  

Where \(P_j C_j\) is the GDP of the target economy, \(\beta\) and \(\alpha\) represent the spending shares of consumers on respectively services and manufacturing goods, while \(1 - \gamma\) is the importance of services as inputs to manufacturing production. \(\Upsilon_j\) contains parameters and other target country’s characteristics.\(^{19}\) Importantly, from equation (2) we can see how these extra-profits are a linear function of \(a_i^{\sigma - 1}\), which can be taken as a positive proxy for productivity (since \(\sigma > 1\)). Moreover, from equation (2) it is clear how the slope of the profit function depends essentially on three things: i) the size of the target economy \((P_j C_j)\), ii) the structural composition of the target economy (parameters \(\beta\) and \(\alpha\)), and iii) the extent of the inter-sectoral linkages present (the parameter \(\gamma\)).

We assume that M&A implies fixed costs, which we model in a flexible way as depending both on bilateral factors such as the distance (physical and cultural) between countries and on source and host country specific factors, including the policy environment \(\Phi_j\):

\[
C_{ij} = C_{ij} (\tau_{ij}, \Phi_j, X_i, X_j)
\]  

Naturally, we observe at least one M&A transaction from country \(i\) to \(j\) iff:\(^{20}\)

\[
\Pi_{ij} - C_{ij} > 0
\]

\(^{18}\)This assumption renders irrelevant the distribution of firms in country \(j\) for the decision of a firm in country \(i\) on whether or not to buy a firm in country \(j\). A more sophisticated assumption could be that the acquired firms productivity is a weighted average of acquiror and target firm’s productivity, respectively. In this case, the key variable capturing the heterogeneity would be the productivity of the match. However, nothing would change in what follows (up to a re-labeling of the variable \(a\)).

\(^{19}\)See the appendix for details.

\(^{20}\)This approach based on a zero-profit condition is similar to Santos Silva et al. (2014).
From equation (4) one can derive, for each country pair $i$ and $j$, the cut-off productivity level $a^\ast_{ij}$ above which a firm from home country $i$ will find it profitable to acquire a firm in country $j$; the marginal firm exhibiting this productivity level will make just enough profits to recoup the fixed cost of the investment. Using equations (2) and (3) this is equal to:

$$
\Upsilon_j \cdot P_j C_j (\beta + (1-\gamma) \alpha) \cdot (a^\ast_{ij})^{\sigma - 1} = C_{ij}
$$

(5)

So we get

$$
a^\ast_{ij} = \left( \frac{C_{ij}}{\Upsilon_j \cdot P_j C_j (\beta + (1-\gamma) \alpha)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}}
$$

(6)

Thus, the condition in equation (4) can alternatively be expressed as the requirement that the productivity of the most productive firm in country $i$ exceed $a^\ast_{ij}$. Let $a_{iH}$ denote the most productive firm in the origin country (the potential acquiror).21

Finally, we can formally derive the number of M&A deals as $M&A_{ij}^{Num} = N_i V_{ij}$, in which case $N_i$ denotes the number of firms in country $i$ and $V_{ij}$ represents the fraction of firms in the country $i$ who are productive enough to be able to acquire a firm in country $j$. $V_{ij}$ is defined by

$$
V_{ij} = \begin{cases} 
1 - G(a^\ast_{ij}) & \text{if } a_{iH} > a^\ast_{ij} \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
$$

Assuming a particular functional form for $G(a)$ allows us to obtain an explicit expression for $M&A_{ij}^{Num}$. Based upon equation (4) and using equations (2) and (3), profit schedules can be depicted as a function of productivity levels in the home country $a_i^{\sigma - 1}$. Figure 3 reports extra-profits and cost for an M&A from a country $i$ to two countries $j$ and $k$, respectively, which differ in the costs associated with each bilateral deal. Assuming that acquisition costs are higher in country $k$ than in $j$, which results in a larger (negative) intercept and a flatter slope of $\Pi_{ik}$ compared to $\Pi_{ij}$, and assuming further that the level of the most productive firm

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21 We assume for simplicity that the value of $a_{iH}$ is the same in every origin country. Letting the support region of productivity distributions differ across countries would introduce an additional margin that is, however, not central to the mechanism we wish to highlight.
in country $i$ is $a_{iH}$, we have $a_{iH} > a^*_{ij}$ but $a_{iH} < a^*_{ik}$. Hence, Figure 3 depicts a example in which investment is profitable between countries $i$ and $j$ (the fraction of firms, or ‘intensive margin,’ highlighted as $V_{ij}$) whereas no M&A deal takes place between countries $i$ and $k$.

**Figure 3: Extra-Profits and Costs of M&As: Two Possibilites**

State Dependency in Policy Effectiveness. The framework presented in this section allows considering what we call state-dependency in policy effectiveness. An illustrative example is set out in Figure (4). The solid lines indicate profits and costs of an M&A operation from home country $i$ to host countries $j$ and $k$, respectively, with associated costs of $C_{ij}^1$ and $C_{ik}^1$. The dashed lines, instead, correspond to an alternative scenario that differs from the former one only in terms of lower costs $C_{ij}^2$ and $C_{ik}^2$, respectively, that might arise from lower policy restrictiveness. Let $a_{iH}$ again denote the productivity of the most productive firm in home country $i$. Intersections of the profit schedules with the horizontal axis indicate the cut-off levels in productivity of the marginal firm in country $i$ that would just break even if it acquired a target in countries $j$ and $k$, respectively. As all the cut-off productivity levels are below the one of the most productive firm in either cost scenario, there are positive M&A flows from country $i$ to both countries $j$ and $k$.

An identical change in investment policies in host countries $j$ and $k$—either from $C_{ij}^1$ to $C_{ij}^2$ or vice versa—will have a differential effect on the expected number of M&As deals (in-
tensive margin). This can be seen by recognizing that the incremental change in the mass of firms for which a deal becomes profitable, is larger for country \( k \) than it is for country \( j \) (in Figure 4, \( \Delta V_{ij} < \Delta V_{ik} \)). The fact that the same policy change can generate two different outcomes, here a change in the expected number of incoming M&As deals, depending on other conditions prevailing in the host country, is what we call state-dependent policy effectiveness. The differential impact depends on the different slopes of the profit lines. A steeper slope indicates a more attractive market in the sense of requiring a lower productivity threshold to render an investment profitable (cf. equation 6), for instance because of a larger market for services. So in the example proposed, the country with the larger market for services will be less affected by a policy change than the country with a smaller market for services.

Figure 4: Example of State-Dependency of Policy Effectiveness
4 Empirical Strategy

In terms of econometric implementation, state-dependent policy impact implies that we allow the effect of policy restrictiveness to vary across countries. Hence, translating the framework of Section 3 into estimable equations involves estimating, in a first step, a vector of country-specific coefficients. In a second step, these estimated coefficients will then be used as the dependent variable in a search for factors causing variation among the individual country parameters.\(^{22}\) The classic study on ‘estimated dependent variable models’ is Saxonhouse (1976) who considered hospital cost functions and regressed individual parameters thereof on sets of independent variables to find systematic causes of variation among firms’ cost functions; see also Hornstein and Greene (2012) and Lewis (2000) for recent econometric contributions. In our context, the first stage consists of estimating a gravity model of bilateral investment flows, from which home and host country fixed effects are retrieved as country-specific estimated means conditional on bilateral investment frictions. In the second stage, these parameters are then to be projected onto variables that include proxies for the three relevant country characteristics which we would expect to drive policy contingency. The remainder of this section specifies the two-stage approach we adopt in the context of service sector investment flows.

4.1 First Stage

We formulate the first stage so as to be able to analyse both the extensive and intensive margin of bilateral M&A, thereby making full use of Thompson Reuters’ Platinum database. As for the extensive margin, we evaluate the probability of observing any bilateral M&A deal between countries \(i\) and \(j\) in sector \(k\).\(^{23}\) As became clear in the previous section, the condition for observing an M&A between a country \(i\) and a country \(j\) is \(a_{iH} > a_{ij}^{*}\), with \(a_{ij}^{*}\) defined as in (6). Following Helpman, Melitz, and Rubenstein (2008), we can express an identical condition by defining a latent variable \(Z_{ij}\) representing the ratio between the discounted

\(^{22}\)We thus adopt a strategy similar to Head and Ries (2008).

\(^{23}\)The sector superscript \(k\) is henceforth omitted to ease notation but all equations hold conditional on \(k\).
value of future profits from an M&A in a given service sector in country \( j \) for the most productive parent company in country \( i \) (\( \Pi(a_{iH}, .) \)) and the cost of the operation defined in (3):

\[
Z_{ij} = \frac{\Pi_{ij} (a_{iH}, .)}{C_{ij} (\tau_{ij}, \Phi_j, X_i, X_j)}
\] (7)

Then the condition \( a_{iH} > a_{ij}^* \), using (6), is equivalent to \( Z_{ij} > 1 \). We assume that \( C_{ij} \) is separable in its main components: \( C_{ij} = \tau_{ij} C_i(X_i) C_j(\Phi_j, X_j) \). Following Helpman, Melitz and Rubenstein (2008), we also assume that \( \tau_{ij} \) is proportional to a vector of bilateral investment frictions \( D_{ij} \), which is stochastic due to unmeasured bilateral frictions \( (\epsilon_{ij}) \) so that \( \tau_{ij} = \exp(D_{ij}'\delta - \epsilon_{ij}) \). Unobserved frictions \( \epsilon_{ij} \) are i.i.d. unit normal distributed. Under these assumptions, taking logs of (7), we can model the probability of observing an M&A with a probit including bilateral variables that can affect the cost of investing from country \( i \) to country \( j \) (included in \( \tau_{ij} \)) and a full set of home and host country fixed effects 24:

\[
z_{ij} = \delta_i + \delta_j - \delta_1 d_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}
\] (8)

\[
MA_{ij} = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } z_{ij} > 0 \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

Bilateral investment costs \( (d_{ij}) \) potentially comprise of geographical, cultural and legal frictions. As geographical variables we include distance, which is expected to dampen bilateral M&A flows, and a dummy for contiguity.25 Cultural distance is captured by dummy variables for common legal origin, common colonial past and common religion. Further self-explanatory controls include separate indicators for the presence of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT)26 or a regional trade agreement (RTA) between two countries, and the total

\[\text{footnote:} 24\text{In general, the Probit model with fixed effects suffers from the so-called incidental parameters problem. However, Heckman (1981) provides Monte Carlo based evidence that in a panel context, the Probit model with fixed effects performs relatively well when the number of periods analyzed exceeds eight. In a cross-sectional context with bilateral dependent variables, such as ours, the analogous concept to the number of periods in a panel context is the number of trading partners, which in our case is above 100.}\]

\[\text{footnote:} 25\text{See Keller and Yeaple (2013) for a model where the negative relation between distance and multinational activity is explained through the presence of barriers to the diffusion of knowledge.}\]

\[\text{footnote:} 26\text{Given the potential endogeneity of these treaties, we insert a dummy equal to one if there was a BIT in}\]
amount of bilateral merchandise trade in 2002. We expect these variables to lower the cost frictions to bilateral investments, due for instance to spill-overs in terms of information flows.

The choice of explanatory variables is therefore in line with Blonigen and Piger (2014) who use Bayesian model averaging to establish inclusion probabilities for a wide range of factors used in modelling the determinants of FDI. They suggest a parsimonious specification comprising of mainly gravity variables, cultural distance factors and trade agreements. The focus in our analysis on M&A, i.e. the acquisition and control of foreign assets, further underscores the potential role of common culture and language (see Head and Ries, 2008) in this first stage estimation.

At the first stage, we also analyze the intensive margin of M&A activity by using the number of M&A deals. In this case, we use a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator (discussed in Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006), including both home country and host country fixed effects and a set of investment frictions $d_{ij}$ identical to the one used in the Probit model (henceforth called the PPML-N model).

### 4.2 Second Stage

In the second stage, we use the estimated host country fixed effects from the Probit model and the PPML-N model and relate them to variation in policy restrictiveness, $\phi_j$, conditional on covariates $x_j$. The second stage’s estimable equation takes the form:

$$
\delta_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \phi_j + \beta_2 X_j + \beta_3 (\phi_j X_j) + \beta_4 W_j + \epsilon_j
$$

(9)

Following on from equation (2), particular interest lies in exploring the size and composition of GDP in the host economy as possible relevant factors included in $X_j$. The interaction effects in equation (9) between the measure of policy restrictiveness and country characteristics $X_j$ serve to explore state dependency in policy effectiveness, i.e. the possibility that the

---

27 Notice that once a functional form is chosen for $G(a)$, the number of M&A transactions from country $i$ to country $j$ can also be expressed as containing both bilateral elements (such as $d_{ij}$) and a full set of host and home country fixed effects.
effect of a given policy depends on other factors as well. Additional country-level controls potentially affecting the attractiveness of cross-border M&A in services are denoted $W_j$.

5 Results

5.1 First Stage: Gravity-type Determinants

Table 2 reports the results of the first-stage Probit model for the aggregate data (column 1) as well as for six different service sectors: Banking, Insurance, Retail, Telecommunications, Transportation and Professional Services.\footnote{The Professional Services sector in our sample includes the Accounting, Engineering and Research sector. Since the M&A dataset records only four transactions in the legal sector, the latter is excluded from the analysis.}

The probability of observing an M&A transaction in services at large (column 1) is negatively correlated with distance. The coefficient on distance is negative and statistically significant across all the subsectors considered. The border dummy displays a positive and significant coefficient when considering the aggregate results. However, at the disaggregated level, sharing a common border seems to affect the probability of observing M&A deals only in the retail and transport sector. The need to establish cross-border networks for delivery and distribution are likely to drive firms to establish a commercial presence in transport and retail in neighbouring countries. Sharing a common legal system seems to affect more the probability of observing M&A in banking, insurance and retail than in telecommunications or accounting services. Sharing a common colonial past affects the probability of observing M&As in all sectors, with the exception of retail and transport. Retail, transport and accountancy are the only sectors where the dummy for common official language does not display a positive and significant coefficient. As another proxy for cultural proximity, we use a common religion\footnote{Common religion is the probability that two people randomly extracted from the two countries belong to the same religion. Formally, it is the sum of the products of the shares of population belonging to the same religions in the two countries.}. As Table 2 shows, the coefficient attached to common religion is

\footnote{Formally the conceptual framework outlined in the previous section would deliver: $\delta_j = \ln(\Upsilon_j) + \ln(P_jC_j) + \ln(\beta + (1 - \gamma)\alpha) - \ln(\Phi_j, X_j)$. The inclusion of interaction terms in specification (9) is the conventional empirical approach when marginal effects are expected to differ along additional dimensions.}
positive and highly statistically significant for all sectors, except for Transport. The presence of a BIT seems to affect the probability of M&As only in the Banking sector.

The intensity of bilateral merchandise goods trade generally has a positive effect on the probability of service sector investment, and the same holds true, to a lesser extent, for the existence (in 2002) of a regional trade agreement. The association with goods trade is even stronger for the intensive margin of services investment (Table 3). This is not surprising as goods trade flows require transportation, finance, communication and other services. In the conceptual framework, the role of merchandise trade is subsumed under bilateral frictions, because explicitly modelling the interaction between goods and services trade flow is beyond the scope of this paper. The primary rationale for including these variables is to minimize the possibility of omitted variable bias. That said, excluding the goods trade variable from the first stage specification has no discernible effect on any of the main findings from the second stage.

The results obtained from using the Probit model are broadly confirmed when we consider the number of deals (PPML-N), with a few minor differences.
## Table 2: First Stage: Probit Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Services</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ProfServ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Distance</td>
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<td>-0.0773</td>
<td>0.5257**</td>
<td>0.0383</td>
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<td>0.2215**</td>
<td>0.2589*</td>
<td>0.2716**</td>
<td>0.0920</td>
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<td>0.3952**</td>
<td>0.4590*</td>
<td>0.1994</td>
<td>0.3202*</td>
<td>0.2616</td>
<td>0.4794*</td>
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<td>0.3525**</td>
<td>0.6763***</td>
<td>0.3129</td>
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<td>Colony</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>0.7614***</td>
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<td>0.9549***</td>
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<td>0.1101</td>
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<td>BIT (2002)</td>
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<td>0.2882*</td>
<td>0.2216</td>
<td>0.3940*</td>
<td>0.2347</td>
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<td>0.1111***</td>
<td>0.2178***</td>
<td>0.0764</td>
<td>0.0862***</td>
<td>0.1109***</td>
<td>0.2590***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host FE</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home FE</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>-715.6</td>
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<td>-287.9</td>
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</table>

Dependent Variable: Indicator variable for presence of M&As between Home country and Host country. Several Sectors. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Table 3: First Stage: PPML-N Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Services</th>
<th>(2) Bank</th>
<th>(3) Insur</th>
<th>(4) Retail</th>
<th>(5) Telecom</th>
<th>(6) Transport</th>
<th>(7) ProfServ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>-0.5658***</td>
<td>-0.6583***</td>
<td>-0.3882**</td>
<td>-0.5611***</td>
<td>-0.5529***</td>
<td>-0.6099***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>-0.1459</td>
<td>-0.2171</td>
<td>-0.3116</td>
<td>0.4478**</td>
<td>-0.3096</td>
<td>0.2341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm legal system</td>
<td>0.2162**</td>
<td>0.2356*</td>
<td>0.4981**</td>
<td>0.2737</td>
<td>0.3337**</td>
<td>0.0514</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colony</td>
<td>0.5729***</td>
<td>0.7590***</td>
<td>0.4477*</td>
<td>0.1985</td>
<td>0.5181***</td>
<td>0.2645</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comm language</td>
<td>0.5067***</td>
<td>0.4223**</td>
<td>0.9045***</td>
<td>0.2274</td>
<td>0.2478</td>
<td>0.5007**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comm religion</td>
<td>1.8565***</td>
<td>1.9706***</td>
<td>2.4841***</td>
<td>1.6408***</td>
<td>1.9898***</td>
<td>0.7660</td>
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<td>BIT (2002)</td>
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<td>RTA</td>
<td>0.3524**</td>
<td>0.2545</td>
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<td>Goods trade (2002)</td>
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<td>0.4020***</td>
<td>0.2552***</td>
<td>0.2114***</td>
<td>0.2933***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Host FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Home FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

| Observations | 7662 | 4971 | 2284 | 2559 | 4700 | 2418 | 1654 |
| R-squared | 0.8953 | 0.7314 | 0.6470 | 0.7832 | 0.6332 | 0.6880 | 0.9329 |
| Log-L | -2705.4 | -1221.7 | -483.9 | -640.1 | -1098.2 | -621.2 | -525.6 |

Dependent Variable: Number of M&As between Home country and Host country. Several Sectors. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
5.2 Second Stage: Sectoral Policy Restrictiveness

Following our empirical strategy, the second stage is about uncovering determinants of any systematic variation in previously estimated host country fixed effects. After accounting for market size and other potentially relevant characteristics, interest centers on the role policy restrictions play in affecting the extensive and intensive margin of service sector investment. To increase the degrees of freedom, we collect host country fixed effects for each of the six sectors for which we have policy information and estimate the second stage pooled over sectors, using a vector of STRI M3 scores that exhibits variation across countries and sectors.

Tables 4 and 5 report results of the second-stage estimations. As a benchmark, we show in model (1) that, conditional on sector fixed effects, neither the overall probability nor the overall frequency of services investment varies systematically with the level of policy restrictiveness applied to commercial presence (log STRI M3). Subsequent models, however, take into account the relevant heterogeneity in terms of the size and composition of GDP suggested by our conceptual framework. As a result, model (2) demonstrates that policy restrictiveness has in general a negative impact on investment inflows, as one would expect, but this effect varies with economic size. Specifically, the coefficient on the interaction term with GDP is positive and significant. The conjecture that the deterrent effect of policy barriers is mitigated in larger economies is thus borne out in the data. The point of subsequent specifications is to analyze this aggregate effect and to relate it to the structure of GDP.

Models (3)-(5) further disentangle this effect whereas models (6)-(8) provide robustness checks. As empirical proxies for structural composition and intersectoral linkages in the target economy, models (3)-(5) include interaction terms with, respectively, the manufacturing and services share in domestic value-added. The associated coefficients are positive.

31In the first stage, probit host country fixed effects cannot be estimated for eight economies (Bolivia, Cameroon, Algeria, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique and Nepal). On average, these countries are similar to the rest of the sample in terms of log income and log per capita income, and exhibit only slightly more restrictive policies. Thus we believe that there is no bias introduced in second stage results by dropping these countries.

32Here we use data from the UN, not from the OECD, in order to be able to keep all the countries in our sample.
and significant while the coefficient on the STRI remains negative and significant; thus, the magnitude of policy barriers’ detrimental effect depends on industrial structure and is partly offset by a relatively large share of manufacturing (or services) in GDP. It is apparent from all models that the mitigating effect of a large manufacturing share is bigger than that of a large services share. The former effect is about twice as large with respect to the probability of receiving investment, and nearly three times as large in terms of the intensive margin (Table 5).

Consider the cases of Vietnam and Botswana, for instance, two countries which exhibit a roughly similar STRI score. The industrial structure of the two countries, however, is quite different. Vietnam has a manufacturing share of 20% of GDP and a services share of about 38%. In Botswana, the manufacturing share is only 3.8% while the service share is 43%. Suppose both countries would engage in policy reforms that lowered their STRI scores in an identical manner. Using as reference point the results displayed in column (7) of Tables 4 and 5, respectively, that same liberalization policy would in Botswana have an average impact about two times as large as in Vietnam in terms of the probability of observing an M&A flows and about three times as large in terms of number of M&A deals.\(^{33}\)

These findings remain qualitatively unchanged when we conduct a large battery of robustness checks. First, the addition of several control variables that capture potential determinants of investment inflows (financial development, the cost of starting a business, government effectiveness, and political stability) does not alter the main results (model 7). Second, we account for the potential endogeneity of policy choices as standard political economy arguments may suggest that reverse causality is an issue. For instance, countries with high levels of M&A activity may be countries in which firms lobby hard to have investment restrictions reduced. We employ two instruments that are correlated with countries’ current policy choices but are not afflicted by such reverse causality concerns. First, we instrument current values of policy restrictiveness with a country’s legal commitments under the Gen-

\(^{33}\)Alternatively, more restrictive policies are associated with much larger negative effects on investment in countries with only small shares of manufacturing value added such as Botswana. Again, this is subject to the caveat that our results only refers to the M&A activity, and not to greenfield investments.
eral Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) made either in 1995 at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round or in 1997 at the conclusion of the negotiations on basic telecommunications. Second, we instrument for a particular country’s policy restrictiveness with the STRI score of another country that is most similar in terms of size, stage of development, and industrial structure, an approach we call ‘nearest neighbor STRI’ (cf. Arnold et al., 2015). Further details of the IV strategies are contained in Annex A.2. Models (6) and (8) demonstrate that the main findings from model (5) are fully robust. There is no strong statistical evidence that the STRI scores are endogenous to begin with. That said, the statistical tests reported underneath models (6) and (8) indicate that the excluded instruments are relevant and exogenous. Importantly, the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions does not reject the null of valid instruments.

We present in an online appendix a variety of further robustness tests:

- We investigate, first, whether our results vary by level of development of the destination country by inserting income group dummies in the second stage regressions. The negative effect of the STRI on both the intensive and extensive margin of M&As seems to be more important for middle and high income countries than for the poor countries. The interaction terms with the services share of value added are now significant only for middle and high income countries, while the interaction terms with the manufacturing share of value added are still positive, significant in some cases (depending on the specification), but not systematically different across different groups of countries. We obtained broadly analogous results by running the regressions on separate samples for developed and developing countries.

- Second, we check whether the results change if we follow the alternative estimation strategy of running our first stage regressions by pooling the bilateral data across all the sectors and using country-sector fixed effects. We do not find significant differences in the results. The pooled estimation represents a more parsimonious specification and controls for correlation across sectors in the first stage. However, it restricts the effects of standard gravity covariates to be the same across sectors, which seems an unduly
restrictive assumption given the differences across services sectors. Therefore, the separate sector-by-sector first-stage regressions remain our preferred specification.

- Third, we address the issue of heteroskedasticity that arises by construction in ‘estimated dependent variable’ models. Thus all second-stage regressions were re-run using the Saxonhouse (1976) GLS technique of weighting all observations by the inverse of the dependent variable’s standard deviation, obtained from the first stage standard errors of the country fixed effects. The results again remain virtually unchanged.

- Fourth, instead of using in our regressions the log of the STRI, we check that using the STRI in levels leaves the main results qualitatively unaffected.

- Finally, we address the fact that the total M&A volume was unevenly distributed in the period 2003-2009. In particular, the volume increased substantially in the 2003-2007 period, and then declined. We run our first stage estimates and second stage estimates on the sub-period 2003-2007 and verify that our results are robust to the different choice of the sample period.

We conclude that the results presented in Tables 4 and 5 lend empirical support to the hypothesis that policy restrictiveness is a significant factor in determining bilateral M&A flows in services sectors. Moreover, we find evidence of policy effectiveness to be state-dependent. Specifically, relatively high shares of manufacturing and services in value-added dampen the effect of a restrictive regime on M&A transactions in service sectors.
Table 4: Second stage: Host Fixed Effects (Probit) and STRI

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
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<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
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<td>Log STRI M3</td>
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<td>-0.1478**</td>
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<td>-0.6944***</td>
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<td>Log GDP (Avg 98-02)</td>
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<td>0.1256***</td>
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<td>(STRI3)x(Avg GDP)</td>
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<td>Share Manuf VA (2002)</td>
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Dependent variable: First-stage fixed effects from probit model. Robust standard errors.
IV estimation: UR commitments and nearest-neighbor STRI excluded instruments in all models (6) and (8).

***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Dependent variable: First-stage fixed effects from ppmln model. Robust standard errors.
IV estimation: UR commitments and nearest-neighbor STRI excluded instruments in models (6) and (8).
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
5.3 Second Stage: Individual Policy Measures

The STRI is a composite index that conveniently summarizes the overall restrictiveness implied by all individual policy measures in a given sector and country. Ideally, we would like to assess the restrictive impact of individual policy measures on M&A decisions. In this section we show, to the extent possible, what aspects of investment policy are likely to drive the detrimental effect associated with high STRI scores. While the results presented below usefully illustrate the rich details behind the STRI and may reveal some of the forces at work, we argue that the econometric problems encountered at this level of disaggregation render the STRI the preferred policy variable. Specifically, jointly estimating the effects of individual policy measures is subject to problems of multicollinearity and loss of observations. Results are collected in Table 6, in which columns 1-4 refer to Probit fixed effects whereas columns 5-8 pertain to the PPML-N model.\textsuperscript{34} Individual policy measures are divided into broad regulatory categories, namely restrictions affecting ‘Market Entry’, ‘Licensing’, and ‘Operations’. We estimate the impact of policy measures by category as well as jointly (in columns 4 and 8), always conditioning on economic size and a full set of sector fixed effects.

The models on ‘Market Entry’ consider a variable that indicates the presence of a restriction in setting up a branch as well as the maximum amount of capital that a foreign investor can hold when acquiring a domestic company or setting up a subsidiary (through greenfield FDI). The positive and significant coefficient on the restriction to open a branch is likely to reflect a substitution effect between these two different forms of entry: firms engage more in M&A when they cannot enter a foreign market via a branch.\textsuperscript{35} Equity restrictions on M&A transactions do not seem to be significantly correlated with the probability of a particular country receiving any cross-border M&A inflow in services. However, equity restrictions on entry via greenfield investments display a positive and significant coefficient. This result is somewhat puzzling and might reflect a complementarity between setting up a subsidiary

\textsuperscript{34}As in Section 5.2, all estimations are pooled across sectors so as to increase degrees of freedom. However, not all individual policy variables are available for all countries or sectors in our sample, which leads to—often substantially—fewer observations in Table 6 compared to Tables 4 and 5.

\textsuperscript{35}The difference between a branch and a subsidiary is that the former is legally still part of the parent firm, whereas the latter is a separate legal entity.
through greenfield FDI and through M&A.

Relevant aspects of the licensing process include differential criteria for domestic and international firms in applying for a license, transparency of licensing criteria, automatic renewal of a license, and transparency in obtaining justification if a license application was denied. We find a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the lack of transparency about the reason for a license denial. Surprisingly, we find a positive and significant coefficient attached to cases of discriminatory licensing criteria. One way to interpret this result is that in the presence of discriminatory licensing, firms might prefer to acquire a local firm (rather than to establish a branch or a subsidiary), and thus be able to apply for a licence as a “domestic” firm. Along the intensive margin, there is in addition evidence of a negative effect when applicable criteria are not publicly available (column 6).

Among the restrictions affecting ongoing operations (ie. post-entry), we explore the role of nationality requirements regarding the workforce and the board of directors, respectively. We find a negative and significant coefficient associated with nationality restrictions for employees, but not on restrictions applying to the board of directors. In practice, the latter often does not add any new information that would not already be embodied in the variable capturing foreign equity participation limits.
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Sector fixed effects: Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes
Observations: 253, 149, 147, 140, 253, 149, 147, 140
Adjusted $R^2$: 0.266, 0.276, 0.272, 0.392, 0.196, 0.176, 0.170, 0.262

Dependent variable: First-stage fixed effects as specified. Robust standard errors.
Columns 4 and 8 jointly evaluate the key restrictions from each of the different regulatory categories that were found to exert a significant impact in the previous specifications. In these specifications, all coefficients that are significant carry the expected sign, with the exception of the equity limits on greenfield investments. We find tentative evidence that policies that seem to matter the most in restricting M&A inflows in services are restrictions on setting up branches, lack of transparency in the licensing process, and restrictions concerning the nationality of employees. The first indicator may reflect a substitution effect among alternative modes of entry; the second appears to reflect the importance investors attach to transparent decision-making, and the last may stem from investors’ sensitivity towards their ability to bring in relevant skills regardless of nationality. These results are plausible and thus constitute a useful complement to the findings derived with the STRI. However, the results must be viewed with caution because only a small number of observations is available for a joint evaluation of individual policies.

6 Conclusions

In this paper we present evidence on the determinants of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in services sectors using comprehensive bilateral M&A flow data and detailed information on policy barriers. Our main interest lies in exploring the impact of policy barriers and other country characteristics after controlling for several bilateral factors. The results show that restrictive investment policies dampen the probability of M&A inflows but this negative effect is mitigated in countries with relatively large shares of manufacturing and (to a lesser extent) services in GDP. The same results hold for the number of M&A deals received. These findings suggest that the impact of policy is state-dependent and related to the composition of GDP in the target economy. The cross-sectional nature of the policy information constitutes an identification challenge. We argue, though, that the two-stage approach, plus a full set of sector fixed effects in the second stage, makes optimal use of the data available and offers a reasonable strategy for isolating the contingent impact of policy barriers. The latter emerges as a systematic determinant of cross-country heterogeneity in
a gravity model of bilateral cross-border investment flows.

There are several avenues for future research. First, it would be interesting to explore more fully the concept of state-dependency in policy effectiveness, which has general applicability. Recognizing this phenomenon also has implications for empirical analysis. Any analysis aimed at assessing the effectiveness of a certain policy could (and maybe should) check whether its impact is state-independent, i.e. explore relevant dimensions along which the effect on the outcome of interest is being dampened or magnified. In so doing, the present study continues a tradition of other policy studies that have employed interaction terms between the policy variable and factors that are conjectured to affect its potency.

Second, it would be interesting to study the dynamics of M&A in services and how they relate to the dynamics of M&As in manufacturing, given that recent evidence indicates services FDI tends to follow manufacturing FDI (Nefussi and Schwellnus 2010; Kolstad and Villanger 2008). Such an analysis would help us understand the spillover effects of policy restrictions on both manufacturing and services investment and assess the impact of destination country industrial structure on each type of investment.

Lastly, it would be important to extend our study to the greenfield investments. It would be interesting to analyze the similarities and the differences in the determinants of greenfield FDI vs. M&As, and whether policy effectiveness is state-dependent also in the case of greenfield FDI.

We plan to pursue these avenues in our future research.
A Appendix

A.1 Conceptual Framework

This appendix provides formal details and derivations within the conceptual framework. Suppose there are \( N \) countries in the world. In a generic country \( i \) a representative consumer enjoys utility from consuming Agricultural goods, Manufacturing goods and Services. The utility function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas (the subscripts \( i \) are omitted for simplicity):

\[
U = C_a^{1-\alpha-\beta}C_m^\alpha C_s^\beta
\]  

(10)

The utility maximization problem implies the following demand functions:

\[
C_a = (1 - \alpha - \beta) \frac{PC}{P_a} 
\]  

(11)

\[
C_m = \alpha \frac{PC}{P_m} 
\]  

(12)

\[
C_s = \beta \frac{PC}{P_s} 
\]  

(13)

Where \( P \) is the aggregate price index, a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of the price indexes in the three sectors:

\[
P = P_a^{1-\alpha-\beta} P_m^\alpha P_s^\beta
\]  

(14)

Labor is the only primary factor of production, and the total endowment of labor is \( \bar{L} \). Agriculture is a perfectly competitive sector. An homogeneous agricultural good is produced using only labor under constant return to scale: \( Y_a = L_a \), where \( L_a \) is the labor employed in the agricultural sector. Agriculture is also the numeraire, hence \( P_a = 1 \), from which it follows that the nominal wage is also one in every sector (we assume free labor mobility across sectors). Manufacturing is a perfectly competitive sector as well. A homogenous manufacturing output is produced using labor and intermediate services \( (Y_m) \):

\[
Y_m = (L_m)^\gamma (Y_m^m)^{1-\gamma}
\]  

(15)

From equation (15) it also follows that \( P_m = w^\gamma P_s^{1-\gamma} \).

Services, finally, is a sector characterized by product differentiation and monopolistically competitive firms. The output of services is a C.E.S. aggregator of individual service varieties with elasticity of substitution \( \sigma = \frac{1}{1-\rho} > 1 \):

\[
Y_s = \left[ \int_0^1 y_s(\omega)^\rho d\omega \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}
\]  

(16)
The price index is the standard C.E.S. ideal price index:

\[ P_s = \left[ \int_0^1 (p_s(\omega))^{1-\sigma} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \]  

(17)

Profit maximization in the manufacturing sector implies the following demand function for labor in manufacturing and intermediate services:

\[ L_m = \gamma P_m Y_m \]  

(18)

\[ Y_m^s = (1 - \gamma) \frac{P_m}{P_s} Y_m \]  

(19)

Profit maximization in the service sector implies a standard optimal pricing rule as a markup over marginal costs:

\[ p_s(a) = \frac{1}{a \rho} \]  

(20)

Profit maximization in the manufacturing sector and utility maximization implies the following demand for each service variety:

\[ y_s(a) = \left( \frac{p_s(a)}{P_s} \right)^{-\sigma} (C_s + Y_m^m) \]  

(21)

To close the model, we need to impose market clearing. The three goods market clearing conditions read:

\[ Y_a = C_a \]  

(22)

\[ Y_m = C_m \]  

(23)

\[ Y_s = C_s + Y_m^m \]  

(24)

While the labor market clearing condition is:

\[ \bar{L} = L_a + L_m + L_s \]  

(25)

Using equations (13) (19) and (20), we can express the additional profits for a parent firm from country \( i \) from an M&A in country \( j \) as:

\[ \Pi_{ij} = p_{sj}(a_i) y_{sj}(a_i) - \frac{1}{a_i} y_{sj}(a_i) \]  

(26)

\[ = (1 - \rho) \frac{1}{\rho^{1-\sigma} P_{sj} a_i^{\sigma-1}} \left( \frac{P_j C_j}{P_{sj}} + (1 - \gamma) \frac{P_{mj} Y_{mj}}{P_{sj}} \right) \]  

(27)

Further manipulating equation (27) by using equations (12) and (23), we can express equation (27) as:
\[ \Pi_{ij} = \Upsilon_j \cdot P_j C_j (\beta + (1 - \gamma) \alpha) \cdot a_i^{\sigma - 1} \]  

Which is equal to equation (2), where \( \Upsilon_j = (1 - \rho) \frac{1}{\rho^{1 - \sigma} P_j^{1 - \sigma}} > 0 \).

### A.2 Instrumental Variables Estimation

Our goal is to identify the effect of policy restrictiveness on variation across countries—conditional on having netted out bilateral frictions—in the probability and frequency of investment inflows. However, standard political economy arguments may suggest that reverse causality is an issue. For instance, countries with high levels of M&A activity may be countries in which firms lobby hard to have investment restrictions reduced.

We employ two instruments that are correlated with countries current policy choices but are not afflicted by such reverse causality concerns. First, we instrument current values of policy restrictiveness with a country’s legal commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) made either in 1995 at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round or in 1997 at the conclusion of the negotiations on basic telecommunications. These commitments vary across services sub-sectors and countries and pre-date applied policies captured in the STRI by more than a decade. The policy restrictiveness of GATS commitments has been quantified by Borchert, Gootiiz and Mattoo (2011) using the same methodology as is used to derive the STRI scores. Thus, even though policies may have evolved, GATS commitment scores provide a proxy for policy choices that originate from within the same country, yet the variable is pre-determined with respect to today’s political economy forces and sector performance. One disadvantage of this instrument is that ten countries in our sample did not make commitments under the GATS, reducing the number of available observations from 341 to 322 for this instrument.

A second strategy for finding an instrument exploits the similarity of economic structure across countries. Specifically, we instrument for a given country’s policy restrictiveness with the STRI score of another country that is most similar in terms of size, stage of development, and industrial structure. Yet the matching country’s policy makers are insulated from any lobbying efforts that might exact an influence on the STRI of the country for which we are seeking an instrument. We call the resulting variable a ‘nearest neighbor STRI’ which, in contrast to the GATS commitments variable, can be constructed for all 103 countries in the sample. A similar approach is applied in Arnold et al. (2015). Here, though, the approach is implemented using the matching procedure incorporated in the Abadie and Imbens (2002) nearest neighbor matching estimator. We match on GDP, per-capita income as well as the shares of manufacturing and services sectors, respectively, in domestic value added.

To the extent that instrument validity can be tested for, both variables perform well. Crucially, even though using GATS commitments comes at a loss of observations, employing both instruments allows an overidentifying restrictions test, which is comfortably passed across all estimations.

A full tabulation of results for second stage Probit and PPML IV estimations, respectively, are available in the Online Appendix.
References


